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Volume Information in Nikkei and TOPIX Futures Transactions
Abstract
According to the Kyle (1985) model of informed trading, information in trade size is likely
to effect a permanent price impact, as opposed to bid-ask bounce, which mainly captures trans-
itory price fluctuation. However, two prominent structural models in the literature do not in-
clude trade size in their framework. In this paper, we present a nesting relationship of major
structural models and formulate a generalized model that includes all relevant trade variables.
A new measure to quantify the amount of information in the order flow is proposed. Using
this price impact measure, our empirical analysis shows that it is indeed the “surprise” in trade
size that contributes significantly in reflecting the price change of Nikkei and TOPIX futures.
1 Introduction
Futures trading requires making decisions with imperfect information, which in turn is transmit-
ted through the trading process itself. How can one explain price changes in index futures? The
classical model of efficient market, in a normative tone, suggests that the futures price should
move in response to its underlying stock index. After all, futures is a derivative, whose price is
derived from the underlying asset. To fully reflect all available information, the price discovery in
the futures market must depend on the price discovery processes of the component stocks.
However, according to the trading-cost hypothesis of price discovery, the market with the low-
est overall trading costs should react most quickly to new information (see Fleming, Ostdiek and
Whaley (1996)). From the perspective of funding costs, trading index futures requires lesser mar-
gin compared to trading a basket of the component stocks. Even in the presence of an exchange
traded fund (ETF) on the same underlying index, taking a short position in futures is much easier
and less costly than short-selling the ETF. Analysis carried out by Brandt, Kavajecz and Under-
wood (2007) on a number of variables influencing the information flows between the cash and
futures market supports this interpretation.
In general, price discovery occurs relatively more in the futures market because transacting
in the cash market is more expensive. As a concrete example, consider the work of Mizrach and
Neely (2008), who investigate information shares in the price discovery process in the US bond
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market across a range of maturities, in both spot and futures markets. Although traders constantly
rely on the futures market for indication on bond market movements, Mizrach and Neely (2008)
bring to light the hitherto neglected role of the futures markets in the US treasury price discovery
from an economic standpoint.
In addition to information intrinsic to the underlying asset, the process of trading itself may
also cause the futures price to move. Transactions per se are informative in reflecting the forces
of supply and demand during price discovery beyond the intrinsic information. In fact, a high
volume of liquidity trade facilitates price discovery, as demonstrated by Barclay and Hendershott
(2003).
Consequently, a closely related research strand of interest is liquidity, especially in relation to
the role of size at the transaction level. The transitory influence of trade direction aside, is volume
at the transaction level more informative in conveying a permanent effect on price movements?
While one would not expect extreme price changes to be caused by a large trading volume alone
(see Weber and Rosenow (2006)), investigation carried out by Manganelli (2005) does support the
hypothesis that the combined effect of trading volume and liquidity can account for price changes
quantitatively. Indeed, the linear equilibrium solution of the Kyle (1985) model suggests that trade
size is informative in determining the transaction price.
He and Wang (1995) smoothen the sharp dichotomy between insiders and outsiders with the
notion of differential information. In their framework, information includes not only new private
signals but also public announcements and market prices. Even the private information is dif-
ferential. Each informed trader has some information that others do not know. An important
implication of their model is that volume reflects information relevant to price discovery.
On the other hand, many existing papers on intraday price movements assume a fixed order
size. Citing consistency with much of the previous literature such as Roll (1984), the structural
models proposed by Huang and Stoll (1997) and Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997)
use the trade sign only to explain the stock price change. In this paper, we propose a structural
model to examine the role of signed trade size in the order flow that affects the price movements
of Nikkei and TOPIX index futures. The proposed model is a generalized version of these two
structural models and the Glosten and Harris (1988) model. A thorough understanding of the
relationship between these models is of vital importance, as they are widely used in the field
of empirical market microstructure. For instance, Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) use these
models to analyze liquidity risk in drift anomalies during post-earnings announcements, while
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Sadka (2006) employs these models to investigate market structures from the perspective of an
informed trader. Furthermore, building on the transaction costs and price impact framework,
Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2005) review the extent to which market frictions can be mitigated by
features of market design such as the degree of transparency, the use of call auctions, the pricing
grid, and the regulation of competition among liquidity suppliers or exchanges.
Asian futures have hitherto been under-represented in market microstructure literature des-
pite their liquidity and importance to the practitioners. In this paper, the choice of two index
futures for empirical analysis is motivated by the fact that after decimalization, the US stocks are
trading at the tick size of a penny and even sub-penny. To decompose a penny into inventory
cost, adverse selection cost, and other order processing cost, as reviewed in Stoll (2000), is of little
relevance from the economic standpoint. By contrast, the tick size of an index futures is sizable.
For example, the Nikkei 225 futures contract, commonly known as the “big” Nikkei, is traded at
the minimum tick size of 10 index points. This 10-point tick size corresponds to U10,000 (or $100
if the exchange rate is U100 for a dollar), given that the contract multiplier is U1,000. The sizeable
tick size calls for an economically significant cost decomposition.
Another motivation is that the Asian index futures can be relied upon to analyze many import-
ant aspects of market microstructure. A rare and interesting example is Berkman and Steenbeek
(1998), who use Nikkei futures to, empirically, reject the hypothesis of the “gravitational effect”1
due to the strong arbitrage link between the onshore market (Osaka Securities Exchange) and the
offshore market (SIMEX)2.
The objective of this paper is two-fold. First, we discuss the nesting relationship of the popular
and widely used structural models in the literature. Having formulated a generalized version
of the structural model, we then address an important question regarding volume information
in Asian index futures transactions. Namely, how much does volume information contribute to
price discovery in terms of permanent price impact? We propose a new framework using the
relative joint price impact (RJPI) measure to quantify the extent a price change is dependent on
three trade variables –trade sign, change in signed volume, and signed volume – after controlling
for the bid-ask bounce (change in trade sign).
Second, we examine the liquidity and the price impact empirically. Using a trade-and-quote
data set that allows unambiguous inference of trade sign, we study the price impact in the trans-
1The “gravitational effect” states that the price of a security is drawn toward the price limit.
2Osaka Securities Exchange merged with the Tokyo Stock Exchange to become the Japan Exchange Group. SIMEX
merged with the Singapore Stock Exchange to become the Singapore Exchange.
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action of Nikkei and TOPIX futures. These futures have different tick size and price multiplier.
They trade in both regular and after hours. We find that the price impact as measured by RJPI is
more pronounced during the after hours session. Since the underlying index does not change as
the cash market has already closed for the day, it is intriguing that the after hours trades tend to
have a larger price impact despite lower liquidity. This result is consistent with the differential
information framework of He and Wang (1995). In this framework, futures trades themselves, as
public information, are interpreted differently by traders. Some become more informed about the
after hours trades and they are better in anticipating how the Japanese market will open on the
following business day.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the structural models and discusses their
relationship with each other. The joint price impact measure to quantify the combined power of
volume and trade sign in explaining the variation of futures price change is proposed in Section
3. We then move on to the empirical analyses in Section 4. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2 Analysis of Structural Models
We consider a pure electronic market without a designated market maker. There is only one limit-
order book for trading a particular security or a derivative product. Traders can see all the limit-
order quotes, along with their respective aggregate quantities. However, information about the
size of each limit order and the identity of the submitter is made unknown to the market parti-
cipants. These institutional features of the trading milieu are typical of many electronic exchanges
around the world.
For a trade to occur on an order-driven electronic exchange, the arrival of a marketable limit
order or an outright market order is necessary. When a trade does occur, it must have been ini-
tiated by such orders. We use xt to denote the direction of a trade at time t. When a buy market
order (or marketable limit order) arrives and a trade consequently occurs at the prevailing best ask
price or higher, the trade direction xt is 1. Conversely, xt = −1 when a trade is executed at the pre-
vailing best bid price or lower upon the arrival of a sell market order (or marketable limit order).
The reason for ‘higher’ in the former case and ‘lower’ in the latter is that at times, the aggregate
quantity of limit orders at the best offer (bid) price is not sufficient to satisfy an incoming market
order to buy (sell) a large amount. Though infrequent, a trade may occur at the displayed quotes’
midpoint owing to the presence of non-displayed limit orders at the midpoint. In this instance,
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xt = 0.
2.1 Roll (1984)’s Model
The analysis of the bid-ask spread is widely recognized to begin with the Roll (1984) model. A
key idea in this classical model is the unobservable true price pit, which is assumed to follow the
random walk, i.e.,
pit = pit−1 + et, (1)
where et is i.i.d. noise of normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2e .
The observed transacted price Pt is the result of trading in the direction of xt, and it is assumed
to relate to pit by the effective spread S as follows:
Pt = pit +
S
2
xt. (2)
Since the change in the true price is noise (∆pit = et), the transaction price change ∆Pt is
∆Pt =
S
2
∆xt + et. (3)
An important insight in Roll (1984) is that given no new information, successive transactions
are equally likely to be a purchase (xt = 1) or a sale (xt−1 = −1) because traders arrive randomly
on both sides of the market. Written in the form of (3), Roll (1984)’s square-root formula for the
spread, i.e.,
S = 2
√
−Cov(∆Pt,∆Pt−1), (4)
can be derived by considering the joint probability distribution for successive price changes (see
Roll (1984) and Chapter 6 in Schmidt (2011)).
2.2 Huang and Stoll (1997)’s Model
In Huang and Stoll (1997), the dynamics of the unobservable true price pit is postulated as
pit = pit−1 + α
S
2
xt−1 + et. (5)
In this hypothetical construct, S again is the bid-ask spread, i.e., the difference between the pre-
vailing bid and ask quotes. The intuition underlying (5) is the idea that the trade direction xt−1
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contains information on the fundamental value of the security, and therefore it should leave a per-
manent impact on pit. In this regard, pit is the post-trade update from the previous value of pit−1.
Notice that in the absence of a bid-ask spread S, (5) is indeed the random walk, i.e., (1).
The parameter α is a percentage of the half spread S/2 that is attributable to the asymmetric
information conveyed by xt−1, in contrast to the public information et. When compared against
the random walk model (1), the new equilibrium price pit is the result of trading, i.e., information
conveyed by xt−1 is permanently incorporated into the new true price pit whenever a trade xt−1
has occurred.
Motivated by the inventory theories for the spread from their previous research works, Huang
and Stoll (1997) further assume that the midpoint of the bid-ask spread is updated as follows:
mt = pit + β
S
2
t−1
∑
i=1
xi, (6)
where β is the proportion of the half-spread attributable to inventory holding costs. Consequently,
the dynamics of a change in midpoint is
∆mt =
(
α+ β
)S
2
xt−1 + et. (7)
Since S/2 is the half spread, and with mt being the midpoint of the bid and ask quotes, the
observed transaction price is
Pt = mt +
S
2
xt. (8)
To obtain an intuitive understanding, consider a special case for which all trades are either at the
best bid price P−t or at the best ask price P
+
t , which are further assumed to be a tick apart. Namely,
S is the minimum tick size, and S = P+t − P−t . In other words, Pt = P±t . If xt = 1, a trade is
at the ask price P+t ; else xt = −1, a transaction occurs at the bid price P−t . Given this highly
liquid trading condition, the right hand side of (8) becomes (P+t + P
−
t )/2± (P+t − P−t )/2, which
is indeed P±t , the trade price at the left hand side of (8). In addition, when a trade is done at the
midpoint of the quotes, xt = 0, and (8) yields Pt = mt as required.
The dynamics of price change ∆Pt is obtained from (7) and (8) as follows:
∆Pt =
S
2
∆xt +
(
α+ β
)S
2
xt−1 + et. (9)
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Viewed in the light of (9), it is clear that the transaction price Pt itself is the true price pit if there is
no bid-ask spread (S = 0).
2.3 Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997)’s Model
In the model proposed by Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997), the market belief about a
security at time t is postulated. This unobservable market belief concerning the security, denoted
by pit, is conditional on all public information up to time t− 1 including xt−1. More importantly,
the change in belief is dependent on the element of surprise in the trade direction, which is xt −
E
(
xt|xt−1
)
. This feature is the key idea underlying their model.
Denoting other public information by et, the postulate for the unobservable price pit in Madhavan,
Richardson and Roomans (1997) is
pit = pit−1 + θ
(
xt −E
(
xt|xt−1
))
+ et. (10)
As a random variable, et has mean 0 and variance σ2e . Like the postulate of the Roll (1984) model
(1), the unobservable pit is a random walk if θ is set equal to zero.
The transaction price is expressed as a reflection of the market belief plus the term φ xt, which
represents a compensation to the trader who provides liquidity. Namely,
Pt = pit + φ xt. (11)
This feature is parallel to (2) in the Roll (1984) model, with φ being the analogue of S/2.
Upon substitution of (11), the transaction price is written as
Pt = pit−1 + θ
(
xt −E
(
xt|xt−1
))
+ φ xt + et. (12)
Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) assume thatE
(
xt|xt−1
)
= ρ xt−1. Since pit−1 = Pt−1−
φ xt−1 from (11) for t− 1, the transaction price Pt becomes
Pt = Pt−1 − φxt−1 + θxt − ρθxt−1 + φxt + et. (13)
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Consequently, the price change ∆Pt = Pt − Pt−1 is obtained as follows:
∆Pt = (θ + φ)xt − (ρ θ + φ)xt−1 + et. (14)
Furthermore, by adding and subtracting θxt−1, (14) can be expressed as
∆Pt = (θ + φ)∆xt + θ(1− ρ)xt−1 + et . (15)
Written in the form of (15), the Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) model is structur-
ally equivalent to the Huang and Stoll (1997) model reviewed earlier. As in (9), the explanatory
variables are identical. The difference, however, concerns the interpretations of the coefficients on
these variables. In the Huang and Stoll (1997) framework, θ + φ is a half of the traded spread S/2
and θ(1− ρ) corresponds to the sum of adverse selection and inventory costs, i.e., (α+ β)S/2. In
the Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) model, however, θ is associated with information
asymmetry while φ is related to the liquidity in the market.
To further understand the importance of trade sign xt, consider how the bid-ask bounce is
described by ∆xt:
∆xt =

±2, if xtxt−1 = −1;
±1, if xtxt−1 = 0;
0, if xtxt−1 = 1.
(16)
In words, the bid-ask bounce occurs if and only if two consecutive trades are moving in the op-
posite directions. On the flip side, if consecutive trades move in the same direction, then ∆xt = 0.
In this case, the price change ∆Pt (as in (9) and (15)) is dependent on xt−1 only. Intuitively it makes
sense as many consecutive trades in the same direction will drive the price either higher or lower.
Moreover, in Roll (1984), the coefficient of ∆xt is the effective (half) spread, as in (3). With these
considerations, (15) is more appealing than (14) as far as the price change dynamics is concerned.
In other words, (θ + φ) in (15) should be considered as the effective (half) spread. It follows that
θ(1− ρ) of xt−1 is the autocorrelation-adjusted cost of information asymmetry.
2.4 Glosten-Harris (1988)’s Model
Thus far, we have shown that the structural forms of the two models for the price change, (9) and
(15), are not distinguishable from each other. One of the reasons for this outcome is that both
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models postulate that the unobservable “true price” or the “market belief about the value of a
security” should depend only on the trade direction xt. Obviously, informed traders will buy on
good (bad) news as quickly as possible, implying that the trade direction xt is positive (negative).
A key contribution of the models for the true price (5) and (10) is the incorporation of information
asymmetry conveyed by xt into the market microstructure analysis. The trade direction plays a
critical role in changing the unobservable price.
Notice that in the Roll (1984) model, the trade direction is absent in the true price process (1).
Stated differently, Huang and Stoll (1997) add to the random walk (1) the component αSxt−1/2,
whereas Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) include θ
(
xt −E
(
xt|xt−1
))
instead. Never-
theless, Section 2.3 shows that both models give rise to the same price change process ∆Pt.
In these three structural models discussed thus far, trade size denoted by Vt plays no role in
price discovery. However, from a practitioner’s point of view, traders are well aware that trade
size does matter, especially in the electronic market where there is no designated market maker
to supply liquidity by obligation. More importantly, the market depth is finite, and a large buy
market order lifts the offer and thereby induces the quotes to rise. Conversely, when a large sell
market order hits the limit-order book, the quotes are likely to fall.
From the theoretical standpoint, informed traders, i.e., those who have the superior capabilities
to stay ahead of the curve, will want to maximize the value of their proprietary information. As
in Kyle (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987), they want to trade in sizeable quantity. Motivated
by this insight, Glosten and Harris (1988) postulate that the unobservable true price is impacted
by not only the trade sign but also the signed trade size as follows:
pit = pit−1 + a0xt + a1vt + et. (17)
Here, vt = xtVt is the signed volume. The key idea is that both the trade direction and the signed
trade size impinge upon the true price a permanent effect. In the Glosten and Harris (1988) model,
the traded price Pt is related to pit as follows:
Pt = pit + b0xt + b1vt. (18)
In other words, the trade also generates a temporary impact through xt and vt. Consequently, the
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price change process from these two postulates (17) and (18) is
∆Pt = b0∆xt + b1∆vt + a0xt + a1vt + et. (19)
Interestingly, it is worthy to note that the price change dynamics in the model of Madhavan,
Richardson and Roomans (1997) (and hence also of Huang and Stoll (1997)) is nested in (19). This
is because, by adding and subtracting a0xt−1, b0∆xt + a0xt in (19) can be rewritten as (a0 + b0)∆xt +
a0xt−1, which is the price change dynamics (15) of the Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997)
model3. Applying the same technique also on the signed volume, (19) is rewritten as
∆Pt = (a0 + b0)∆xt + a0xt−1 + (a1 + b1)∆vt + b0vt−1 + et. (20)
2.5 Surprise in the Signed Volume
Starting with the relatively simple view of the market and price changes depicted in Roll’s model
(see section 2.1), subsequent models have built on top of the insight drawn in this early model
and increased the level of complexity of the model. Clearly, the assumption that markets are
weakly efficient will inevitably ignore information and possible asymmetries. Such a model will
not lead to any strategies other than an approximation to the bid-ask spread and the suggestion
that price movements are inherently mean reverting. One should take into consideration that, bid-
ask bounce only contributes transitory fluctuation to the price process, while actual information
with permanent price impact is contained in the volume information.
Now, an ingenious idea in Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) is the notion of surprise
in the trade direction. This idea is founded on the observation that generally speaking, when xt−1
is +1, the subsequent xt tends to be +1 as well. The converse can also be said about the case
where xt−1 is −1. Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) argue that it is really the surprise
xt −E
(
xt|xt−1
)
that creates a permanent impact to the unobservable true price.
On the electronic exchange, the same observation holds true for the signed volume. Small trade
quantity Vt−1 tends to be followed subsequently by a small Vt in the same trade direction. But
when a surprisingly large trade occurs, it is likely to elicit a response by the market participants
to update their belief about the true price. All things considered, it is therefore reasonable to
3Moreover, (a0 + b0)∆xt + a0xt−1 can also be rewritten as (a0 + b0)xt − b0xt−1, which is equivalent to the functional
form of (14).
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postulate the true price in parallel to (10) as follows:
pit = pit−1 + θ1
(
xt −E
(
xt|xt−1
))
+ θ2
(
vt −E
(
vt|vt−1
))
. (21)
Again, vt = xtVt is the signed volume. The element of surprise in the signed volume is captured
by the term with coefficient θ2.
The transaction price corresponding to this postulate of the market belief is, in parallel to (11),
Pt = pit + φ1 xt + φ2 vt + et. (22)
Applying the same line of reasoning in Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) discussed in
Section 2.3, the subsequent trade direction expected at time t − 1 is expressed as E(xt|xt−1) =
ρ1xt−1. In the same fashion, E
(
vt|vt−1
)
= ρ2vt−1 expresses the market expectation at time t − 1
about the subsequent signed trade size. Applying the same algebraic steps in Section 2.3, we
obtain
∆Pt = (θ1 + φ1)∆xt + φ1(1− ρ1)xt−1 + (θ2 + φ2)∆vt + φ2(1− ρ2)vt−1 + et . (23)
This is a structural model comprising the bid-ask bounce ∆xt, the trade direction xt−1, the change
in signed volume ∆vt, the signed volume vt−1, and other public information et.
Finally, we highlight the fact that the Glosten and Harris (1988) model is a special case of (23).
Indeed, if both ρ1 and ρ2 are set equal to zero, the generic (23) reduces to (20).
2.6 Summary
It is interesting to note that a crucial component in the models of Roll (1984), Huang and Stoll
(1997), Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997), and Glosten and Harris (1988) is the unob-
servable price pit. It is called the true price or the market belief concerning the value of the security,
or some other names such as the efficient price in the literature. Nevertheless, common to these
four models is the fact that they all start from pit. Their difference is the apparently different way
to incorporate trade variables that are deemed to change or update the unobservable pit.
Furthermore, in these models, the “permanent” impact is the effect that a trade has on the
unobservable price pit, which is the true value of a security. The temporary impact, on the other
hand, is the effect that affects the transaction price Pt. In summary, we tabulate the models from
the simplest to the most general as follows:
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Unobservable Price Transaction Price Price Change Dynamics
pit = Pt = ∆Pt =
Roll RW, i.e., pit−1 + et pit +
S
2
xt
S
2
∆xt + et
Huang & Stoll RW +
αS
2
xt−1 Midquote +
S
2
xt
S
2
∆xt + (α+ β)
S
2
xt−1 + et
Madhavan et al. RW + θ
(
xt − ρxt−1
)
pit + φxt (θ + φ)∆xt + θ(1− ρ)xt−1 + et
Glosten & Harris RW + a0xt + a1vt pit + b0xt + b1vt (a0 + b0)∆xt + a0xt−1
+(a1 + b1)∆vt + a1vt−1 + et
This paper RW + θ1(xt − ρ1xt−1) pit + φ1 xt + φ2 vt (θ1 + φ1)∆xt + θ1(1− ρ1)xt−1
+ θ2(vt − ρ2vt−1) + (θ2 + φ2)∆vt + θ2(1− ρ2)vt−1 + et
As far as the dynamics of the price change ∆Pt is concerned, the nesting relationship is depicted
as follows:
Roll ⊂ Huang & Stoll = Madhavan et al. ⊂ Glosten & Harris. (24)
Finally, as highlighted earlier, with ρ1 = ρ2 = 0, the price change dynamics (20) of Glosten and
Harris (1988) is a special case of (23).
3 Joint Price Impact Measure
The model (23) has more explanatory variables compared to (15). It is now not straightforward
to interpret the coefficients. Nevertheless, in light of the Roll (1984) model, and also discussed in
Section 2.3, the coefficient to the term ∆xt should be interpreted as a half of the effective spread.
On the other hand, instead of separately, one can interpret the three terms xt−1, ∆vt, and vt−1 in
(20) or (23) jointly as order-flow information beyond the bid-ask bounce. This information impacts
the true price pit.
Given these considerations, for the Roll (1984) model, the linear regression specification is
∆Pt = c˜0 + c˜1∆xt + e˜t, (25)
for the Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) model or the Huang and Stoll (1997) model,
the specification is
∆Pt = c′0 + c′1∆xt + c
′
2xt−1 + e′t, (26)
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and finally for the generic model proposed in Section 2.5, the corresponding multiple regression
is
∆Pt = c0 + c1∆xt + c2xt−1 + c3∆vt + c4vt−1 + et. (27)
This specification is comparable to the Glosten and Harris (1988) model. For specification com-
pleteness, the terms c˜0, c′0, and c0, respectively, are included. The null hypothesis for each of these
intercepts is zero. As discussed earlier, ∆xt captures the bid-ask bounce. If follows that c1 is the
effective (half) spread.
Now, it is not as straightforward to interpret c2, c3, and c4. As an example, c2 of xt−1 is a
pure adverse selection cost in (15) under the Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) model,
and also in (20) under the Glosten and Harris (1988) model. However, in the Huang and Stoll
(1997) model, it is the proportion of the spread that is attributable to not only the adverse selection
but also the inventory costs of the liquidity providers, which are not economically related to the
fundamental value of the security. Therefore, we propose a measure of price impact that captures
the information conveyed by xt−1, ∆vt, and vt−1 jointly. The proposed measure of joint price
impact is simple yet intuitive. It accounts for the combined contribution of these three explanatory
variables in (27) concurrently. The crucial question is: How much do xt−1, ∆vt, and vt−1 jointly
explain ∆Pt after controlling for the bid-ask bounce?
We use the notion of coefficient of partial determination to answer the question. As explained
in Maddala (2010), suppose there are two explanatory variables x1 and x2 for the dependent vari-
able y. Let r21 be the coefficient of determination for the first linear regression of y on x1 only, and
let R212 be the determination of coefficient when both x1 and x2 are included in the second linear
regression. The proportion of explained sum of squares explained by x2 in the second regression,
denoted by r22·1, can be backed out in the following way.
Let Syy be
n
∑
i=1
(yi − y)2 where y is the sample mean for the dependent variable estimated with
n samples. Then, Syy
(
1 − r21
)
is the residual sum of squares for the first simple linear regres-
sion, and Syy
(
1− R212
)
is the residual sum of squares for the second linear regression. Since r22·1
measures the proportion of the explained sum of squares contributed by x2 in the second regres-
sion, the unexplained residual sum of squares of the second regression is therefore reduced to(
1− r22·1
)
Syy
(
1− r21
)
. But this is none other than Syy
(
1− R212
)
. It follows that
1− R212 =
(
1− r21
)(
1− r22·1
)
, (28)
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and one obtains
r22·1 =
R212 − r21
1− r21
. (29)
Denote the coefficient of determination of (25) by r2spread and that of the full equation (27) by
R2all. The quantity of interest, r
2
perm · spread, which is the joint explanatory power of xt−1, ∆vt, and
vt−1 in (27), can be backed out in an analogous fashion from the following equation:
r2perm · spread =
R2all − r2spread
1− r2spread
. (30)
It is noteworthy that r2perm · spread ranges from 0
(
when r2spread = R
2
all
)
to R2all
(
when r2spread = 0
)
.
For ease of reference, we shall henceforth call the partial coefficient of determination r2perm · spread,
which is implied from (30), the measure of joint price impact (JPI), i.e.,
JPI := r2perm · spread. (31)
Intuitively, a larger value of JPI suggests that the trade sign, change in signed volume, and the
signed volume are together able to explain much of the variation in the price change over and
above what has already been explained by the bid-ask bounce. Since the variation in price change
is volatility, a larger JPI also suggests a larger degree of fluctuation in intra-day return.
Given that R2all > 0, we define the measure of relative joint price impact (RJPI) as
RJPI :=
JPI
R2all
. (32)
As a ratio, RJPI allows comparison to be made equitably over different days when each day’s R2all
is different. Cross-sectionally, RJPI compares the extent of permanent price impact (in the context
of structural models) across different futures contract types.
14
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data
4.1.1 Institutional Features of Nikkei and TOPIX futures
The Nikkei 225 index, more commonly referred to as Nikkei, is a stock market index started and
maintained by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japanese Economic Newspaper) since 1950. It is the
benchmark index for the Japanese equity market, along with the Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX)
published by the Japan Exchange Group (JPX). These two indices are based on the domestic stocks
listed on the first section of Tokyo Stock Exchange. The Nikkei index has 225 component stocks
whereas TOPIX is a composite of all the listed stocks. During our sample period from June 28,
2012 to end of December 2014, the average number of companies listed on the First Section is
about 1,776. Notably, Nikkei is a price-weighted index but TOPIX uses the free-float adjusted
market capitalization to calculate the index level, with January 4, 1968 as the base date at 100
points.
TOPIX future contract was launched in September 1988.The original (large) Nikkei contract
was also launched in September 1988, but the mini contract was launched much later in July 2006.
All these futures products follow quarterly cycle with contract months of March (H), June (M),
September (U), and December (Z). At any single point in time, the TOPIX futures and the Nikkei
futures have 5 contract months traded, while the Nikkei mini futures only has 2 contract months
traded.
From 9 a.m. Japan Standard Time (UTC +9) until 3 p.m., the stock market in Tokyo is open for
equity trading, with a break from 11:30 a.m. for an hour. By contrast, futures market starts trading
from 9 a.m. continuously until 3:10 p.m. without a break. At 3:15 p.m., the closing auction takes
place. The trading hours from 9:00 hours to 15:10 hours are referred to as the regular hours. It is
also referred to as the T trading session because the trades will be settled at the day of trading.
While the stock market has already closed for the day, the futures market re-opens from 4:30 p.m.
until 3 a.m the following day. This overnight market is referred to as the after hours or T+1 trading
session, as the trades are settled a day later.
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4.1.2 Descriptive Statistics
For empirical analysis, we have collected tick data of Nikkei and TOPIX futures from Bloomberg.
These two index futures contracts are widely traded during Asian hours until the lunch time in
New York. In addition, the mini version of the Nikkei futures is the most liquid index futures
derivative in terms of number of trades. An overview of the data set is presented in Panel A of
Table I. Trading of TOPIX futures, previously taking place at the Tokyo Stock Exchange, moved
to the Osaka Securities Exchange due to the merger of the two exchanges in 20134. Subsequent
to the move, the closing time for night sessions (T+1 settlement) has been extended from 11:30
p.m. to 3 a.m. of the following day, to be in line with the other derivatives traded at the Osaka
Securities Exchange. The averages in Panel A are computed over 10 futures maturities (March-
2012 to December-2014). We have avoided any overlapping by only including the nearest maturity
contract for each period since longer-term contracts are not as actively traded. The relatively
smaller trade and volume for T+1 settlement observed for the TOPIX futures is attributable to the
shorter T+1 session before the merger.
Among the three futures, the Nikkei mini futures has the smallest tick size and price multi-
plier, making it the cheapest to trade. Consequently, liquidity is higher for the Nikkei mini fu-
tures, manifesting in the largest daily average number of trades and volume for both T and T+1
settlements. However, given the large price multiplier of the big Nikkei futures (and the TOPIX
futures), the daily average notional amount traded, defined as trade price × volume × price mul-
tiplier, is still dominated by the big Nikkei futures. In contrast to the Dow and S&P 500 index
futures for which the bulk of the liquidity had migrated to the E mini’s, we find no evidence of
significant liquidity migration from the big Nikkei futures to the mini Nikkei futures in terms of
the notional value traded.
A full breakdown view of the 10 contract maturities across 3 futures types is presented in
Panel B of Table I. Overall, the data set included in this analysis comprises 57.2 million trades
with a total volume of 549.25 million contracts. On average, 60% (64%) of the trades (volume) are
executed under regular trading hours (T settlement), with the remaining executed after regular
trading hours (T+1 settlement). Of the three futures contract types, TOPIX futures and Nikkei
futures amount to approximately 13% of the total trades each, while the bulk of the trades are
made up of Nikkei mini futures at 74%. Note that for the TOPIX futures, T+1 trading session is
4Derivatives products listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, including TOPIX stock index futures, among others, have
been transferred to the Osaka Securities Exchange since January 2014.
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much less liquid at first. Nevertheless, the percentage of T+1 TOPIX futures trades progressively
increases for more recent data after the merger, possibly due to the extended hours of trading.
The large trading volume in all three instruments suggests that there is abundant liquidity in the
futures market and that the number of observations is sufficient for estimation on the daily basis.
4.1.3 Inference of Trade Sign
An advantage of using Bloomberg’s tick data is that the trades and the best quotes are recorded in
the same stream in the order of their broadcast from the exchange. Take for example, the following
segment of records chosen randomly from the big Nikkei futures:
Record Number Date Time Type Price Size
1264 2012-09-10 8:01:07 B 8780 344
1265 2012-09-10 8:01:07 A 8790 314
1266 2012-09-10 8:01:07 T 8790 10
1267 2012-09-10 8:01:07 B 8780 344
1268 2012-09-10 8:01:07 A 8790 304
Though the time stamp is at the resolution of one second, the order of arrival is indicated by
the record number. The alphabet A is the abbreviation for best ask, and the alphabet B refers to
best bid.
We see that two pairs of best bid and ask surround the trade T at the price of 8790. Prior to the
trade of 10 contracts, the number of contracts at the best bid is 344, and that of the best ask is 314.
Clearly, the trade is executed at the ask price, which we infer as buyer-initiated. Immediately after
the trade, the number of contracts for the best ask is reduced by 10, while the number remains
unchanged for the best ask. Therefore, the trade sign or the trade direction can be unambiguously
inferred from the Bloomberg tick data.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Before any regression analysis, an understanding of the descriptive statistics of the data set is
important. Taking the Dec-2014 futures as an example (TP14Z, NO14Z, and NK14Z), Table II
presents the descriptive statistics of the exploratory variable (dp) and the explanatory variables
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(dx, x, dv, and v). The price change, dp, is calculated as the return in basis points:
dpt = 10000 ln
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
≈ 10000Rt.
The main advantage of quantifying price change in this format (instead of raw price difference) is
that the coefficients of dx and x become comparable across the three futures.Mean, standard devi-
ation, skew, and kurtosis of these parameters are tabulated. The statistics are calculated separately
for T (i.e. regular hours trading) and T+1 (i.e. after hours trading) settlements to provide clarity of
the characteristics defining these two types of settlement.
We note that the standard deviation of dx tends to be higher for T+1 vs. T trading. A higher
standard deviation of dx is the result of dx = ±2 occurring more frequently than dx = 0 or
dx = ±0. Since ±2 corresponds to the bid-ask bounce, this higher standard deviation suggests
that more bid-ask bounce tends to be more frequent at the T+1 session. On the other hand, the
standard deviations of dv and v are lower in T+1 trading session. This could be attributed to the
fact that liquidity in general decreases in after hours trading.
4.3 Regression Analysis
To quantify the influence of bid-ask bounce (dx), trade direction (x), change in signed volume
(dv), and signed volume (v) on the price movement (dp), linear regression model in the form of
Equation (27) is performed. For a start, Panel A of Table III compares the regression results for
Dec-2014 futures (TP14Z, NO14Z, and NK14Z) as an example. The results in Table III are typical
and qualitatively no different for other maturity cycles. Ordinary least squares regressions are
performed separately for T and T+1 settled trades.
Based on the Newey-West adjusted t statistics, we infer that all the parameter estimates for dx,
x, dv, and v are statistically significant at the 99% level, while the estimate for the intercept is not
statistically significant5, except for TOPIX futures. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the Newey-
West adjusted t statistics for the intercept in the case of TOPIX futures is smaller by an order of
magnitude compared to the Newey-West adjusted t statistics for dx, x,, dv, and v. Overall, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis for the y intercept.
The coefficient estimates of dx for all three types of futures are positive. Between T and T+1
5The t-statistics are computed with the Newey and West (1987) adjustment for serial correlations. We apply the
recommendation in Newey and West (1994) to select the number of lags with the Bartlett kernel. Based on the Newey-
West t-statistics, the estimates for dx, x, dv, and v are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.
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settlements, we observe that the magnitude of the coefficient of dx is, though consistently lower
for T+1 settlement, is quite comparable.
For the trade direction (x), we observe that the coefficient is negative for the Nikkei 225 futures,
while for the Nikkei 225 mini futures, it is positive for T trading session while negative for T+1
trading session. Under normal circumstances, one would expect this coefficient to be positive, as
in the Huang-Stoll/Madhavan-Richardson-Roomans model. However, given that trade direction
x and signed volume v contain overlapping information, the two need to be considered together.
We observe that the coefficients for v are all positive and consistently larger than the coefficients
of x. Consequently, the negative coefficients observed in some cases is probably an artifact of this
overlap, as x and v perform partially similar role in the regression. For both x and v, the ceofficient
estimates exhibit larger magnitude for T+1 trading session as compared to T session. This finding
is consistent with the view that in after hours trading, given the reduced liquidity, each trade in
a given direction is expected to carry more information, and a relatively smaller trade size could
potentially produce a comparatively larger price impact.
However, the coefficient estimates of dv for the Nikkei mini futures is negative, albeit their
values are an order of magnitude smaller than those of the TOPIX and big Nikkei futures. This
finding is not necessarily inconsistent, since the coefficient of dx is still positive. Similar to the case
of trade direction x vs. signed volume v, dv and dx contain overlapping information as well.
4.4 Model Comparisons
To provide an in-depth understanding of the relationship between major structural models, Table
IV compares the regression results of 3 distinct market microstructure models: equation (25) based
on Roll (1984), equation (26) based on Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) and Huang
and Stoll (1997), and equation (27) based on both Glosten and Harris (1988) and the generalization
proposed in this paper.
As examples we have provided the results for the Dec-2014 futures in the Table III, though
the observed characteristics are general and applicable to all futures investigated. In addition
to the regression results, adjusted R2, AIC and BIC are also provided. First, we observe that as
more explanatory variables are added, the adjusted R2 progressively increases, showing that the
regression model with a larger number of explanatory variables are able to better explain the
variation in the exploratory variable dp. AIC gradually decreases, highlighting the fact that the
improvement is not compromised by model complexity.
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The coefficients of dx, common across all three models, are very comparable. Moving from the
equation (25) to equation (26), the joint price impact measure, which quantifies the incremental
explanatory power as new variables are added to the regression model, reveals that the addition
of the trade direction x as explanatory variable improves the adjusted R2 of the model. Finally,
moving from the equation (26) to equation (27), the joint price impact measure shows that the
additional volume information captured by dv and v is significant. Note that in equation (26), the
coefficients of x are all positive. However, in equation (27), the coefficient of the Nikkei futures
(NK) becomes negative, while v is positive. This is the information overlapping effect discussed
earlier, as the roles of x and v in explaining dp are similar.
To provide a complete picture of the three futures type with hourly breakdown, Figure 1 plots
the coefficient estimates of the full regression results based on Equation 27 by hourly buckets.
From the adjusted R2 plot, it is observed that a better fit is obtained during regular trading hours
across all futures types. For TOPIX (TP) and Nikkei (NK) futures, the goodness-of-fits drop no-
ticeably after normal trading hours as we move over to T+1 trading session. On the other hand,
the adjusted R2 of the Nikkei mini (NO) futures remains relatively high even as market moves
from regular to after hours trading (T to T+1 settlement). Naturally, being the futures with the
smallest tick size and price multiplier, liquidity centers around it. In addition, we note that the
coefficient estimates for Nikkei mini futures remain generally static over the entire trading day
with very little variation, as compared to TOPIX and big Nikkei futures (NK). Figure 2 plots the
relative joint price impact (RJPI) by hourly buckets for all three futures contract types over the
entire sample period, showcasing the intraday breakdown of the incremental contribution from
volume information (dv and v) and trade direction (x).
To furnish a complete picture of the coefficient estimates in the regression analysis, Figure 3
plots the daily regression results of the three futures contract types across 2.5 years (10 futures
each). The vertical dotted lines indicate the maturity of each futures, where spikes in the coeffi-
cients are observed at the last trading day of current futures. This finding is intuitive, since the
current futures expires a day later, liquidity will migrate to the next futures. Overall, the coeffi-
cient estimate for dx exhibits a declining trend over time. Model based on equation (27) tends to
have smaller x coefficients, and the weights shift to volume information (“surprise”) captured by
dv and v.
In addition, over the period of the merger between Tokyo Stock Exchange and the Osaka Se-
curities Exchange in 2013, we observe considerable fluctuations in the regression coefficients, par-
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ticularly over July 2013, when the cash equity market was integrated and the self-regulatory and
clearing operations were consolidated. These transient effects dissipate after the merger and trad-
ing venue move were completed in 2014.
4.5 Joint Price Impact Measure
Finally, we come to the most important part of our analysis. Table V compares the relative joint
price impact (RJPI) across hourly buckets. The number of trades and volume both distinctly dis-
play an intraday U-shaped pattern during regular trading hours (from 9 a.m. to 3:10 p.m.). This
pattern clearly suggests that liquidity tends to center around the beginning and the end of the
regular trading session, which is consistent with the finding in the extant literature. The impact of
adding volume information (dv and v) manifests in the relatively higher values of RJPI compared
to the incremental contribution from x. This trend is consistently observed across all the three
futures types. The empirical evidence suggests that during the regular hours, the incremental
information of trade sign (x) is relatively small compared to the volume information.
The impact of adding volume information is even more pronounced in the after hours (T+1)
trading. For the two Nikkei futures especially, the RJPI with the addition of volume information
can be 3 to 10 times higher compared to the trade sign information alone. Notably, the number
of trades and volume traded are significantly lower in the T+1 session compared to the regular
hours. Moreover, the average trade size per trade is also smaller.
A high volume of liquidity trade facilitates price discovery (seeBarclay and Hendershott (2003)).
Thus prices are more efficient and more information is revealed per hour during the regular hours
than after hours, as we have observed in Table V. However, the lower trading volume after hours
generates disproportionately significant price impacts. It appears that individual trades contain
more information after hours than during the regular hours.
Since the cash market has already closed for the day and the underling cash indices do not
change in the after hours session, what information is it that drives the price change in futures?
According to the proprietary traders who trade in the after hours session, they look at the price
movements in European futures such as DAX and EURO STOXX 50 futures, and also the E min
S&P 500 index futures. When the prices of these futures move higher or about to move higher
(lower), after hours TOPIX and Nikkei futures traders tend to take long (short) positions. Major
macro-economic announcements such as the non-farm payroll at 8:30 Eastern Time will also affect
the way they trade.
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In Figure 4, we present the incremental information captured by x, dv, and v on a daily basis.
The relative joint price impact is computed on every trading day based on a daily regression run
across the full 2.5 years covered by the 10 futures. We observe that in general, x adds the smallest
amount of information, while v and dv contribute comparatively significant price impact.
5 Conclusions
A deeper understanding of the motivations underlying trades and econometric modeling can be
achieved by adopting the paradigm of structural models. Transactions in the financial markets are
often characterized by their liquidity. Consequently, volume information ought to be an integral
part of the structural models.
The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is two-fold. The first contribution is
the in-depth review and analysis on major structural models: their economic rationale and their
specification of price change dynamics, transaction price, and the unobservable true price. In par-
ticular, the nesting relationship between the Roll model, the Huang-Stoll/Madhavan-Richardson-
Roomans model, and the Glosten-Harris model is established. A generalized framework that
draws upon the insights of these models is formulated, taking into account information asym-
metry and the impact of “surprise” in both trade direction and volume on the unobservable true
price. Our proposed model ensures that all important transaction information is captured. To
quantify the explanatory power of variables acting as carriers of information – in particular the
signed volume information – as well as their contribution to price discovery, we formulate a joint
price impact measure. This new measure is based on the coefficient of partial determination in
econometrics.
The second contribution is the empirical analysis on Nikkei and TOPIX futures. We include
a pre-processing procedure to account for a single large market order scooping up all the small
quotes in the limit-order book. For the purpose of transaction settlement, matching of a big market
order against many small limit orders is reported by the exchange as a collection of small trades.
Our analysis supports the hypothesis that volume information contributes significantly to price
impact. Building upon Roll’s model, the signed volume provides the largest amount of informa-
tion asymmetry, followed by signed volume change. Our analysis shows that the least important
explanatory variable is in fact the trade direction.
Signed volume contains both size information and trading direction information. Its role is a
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superset of the role played by trade direction alone. The “surprise” in signed volume quantifies
the price movement’s dependence on an unexpected change in signed volume. We discover that
for Nikkei 225 and TOPIX futures with medium liquidity, an unexpected change in volume is
likely to exert a price change in the same direction as the trade. Intriguingly, the opposite is
observed for the Nikkei 225 mini contract, which is the most liquid futures in the sample. An
unexpected increment in the trade size is likely to bring about a price change in the opposite
direction.
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Table I: Data set
Futures contract details with trade and volume summary. Three futures contracts are included in this study: TOPIX
(TP), Nikkei (NK), and Nikkei mini (NO). NK has the largest tick size and value per tick, followed by TP. Among the
three contracts, NO has the smallest price multiplier, tick size and value per tick. Consequently, it is the most liquid
contract. The trade and volume tally are based on the dataset used in this work (10 maturities per contract type). We
also provide the breakdown by settlement (T and T+1) to contrast the liquidity at normal trading hours vs. after hours
session.
Panel A
TOPIX Futures Nikkei Futures Nikkei Mini Futures
Bloomberg Ticker TP NK NO
Underlying Index TOPIX Nikkei 225 Nikkei 225
Price Multiplier (U) 10,000 1,000 100
Tick Size 0.5 points 10 points 5 points
Value Per Tick (U) 5,000 10,000 500
Daily Average Number of Trades (T) 4094 2630 14563
Daily Average Number of Trades (T+1) 754 1769 11598
Daily Average Volume (T) 21193 20635 174631
Daily Average Volume (T+1) 2364 9085 110221
Daily Average Notional Amount Traded (T) (×109) 249 296 252
Daily Average Notional Amount Traded (T+1) (×109) 30 133 162
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Panel B
Trades (×106) T/T+1 (%) Volume (×106) T/T+1 (%)
Notional
Amount
Traded (×109)
T/T+1 (%)
TP
12U 0.25 92.27/7.73 1.75 95.13/4.87 12978.40 95.13/4.87
12Z 0.30 92.12/7.88 2.09 94.69/5.31 15664.53 94.68/5.32
13H 0.38 90.66/9.34 2.79 94.23/5.77 25562.03 94.19/5.81
13M 0.87 87.75/12.25 4.76 91.64/8.36 53456.30 91.67/8.33
13U 0.81 87.49/12.51 3.23 91.16/8.84 37002.69 91.15/8.85
13Z 0.66 87.83/12.17 2.84 91.90/8.10 34342.31 91.89/8.11
14H 0.73 87.24/12.76 3.32 91.62/8.38 41058.10 91.63/8.37
14M 0.57 87.46/12.54 2.71 91.72/8.28 31948.01 91.71/8.29
14U 0.48 81.70/18.30 2.52 87.47/12.53 31939.68 87.46/12.54
14Z 0.79 77.96/22.04 3.57 84.68/15.32 47143.47 84.76/15.24
N
K
12U 0.23 67.61/32.39 2.16 75.24/24.76 19073.07 75.27/24.73
12Z 0.28 65.35/34.65 2.62 72.76/27.24 23678.38 72.74/27.26
13H 0.44 65.73/34.27 3.96 72.02/27.98 43194.19 71.88/28.12
13M 1.03 61.95/38.05 7.13 70.15/29.85 96993.79 70.18/29.82
13U 0.78 67.85/32.15 4.64 75.75/24.25 63898.06 75.80/24.20
13Z 0.60 66.15/33.85 4.07 72.77/27.23 59893.39 72.72/27.28
14H 0.68 59.27/40.73 4.42 69.27/30.73 66730.45 69.36/30.64
14M 0.55 56.23/43.77 3.30 68.08/31.92 47807.16 68.15/31.85
14U 0.44 57.59/42.41 3.06 66.69/33.31 46906.74 66.65/33.35
14Z 0.74 54.19/45.81 4.97 64.20/35.80 81065.26 64.46/35.54
N
O
12U 1.39 60.53/39.47 19.47 68.79/31.21 17223.19 68.82/31.18
12Z 1.65 59.72/40.28 25.46 65.10/34.90 22999.21 65.09/34.91
13H 2.65 58.72/41.28 37.97 64.04/35.96 41540.99 63.82/36.18
13M 5.50 56.45/43.55 70.17 61.22/38.78 95644.97 61.28/38.72
13U 5.03 60.25/39.75 44.49 66.91/33.09 61319.37 67.01/32.99
13Z 3.61 62.17/37.83 37.15 67.86/32.14 54721.44 67.86/32.14
14H 4.16 57.76/42.24 40.64 61.77/38.23 61433.31 61.97/38.03
14M 3.37 55.16/44.84 30.12 56.78/43.22 43601.91 56.86/43.14
14U 2.72 56.16/43.84 28.00 59.73/40.27 42977.77 59.69/40.31
14Z 4.36 50.17/49.83 48.79 56.51/43.49 79573.93 56.86/43.14
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Table III: Regression analysis.
Regression in the form of
Eq. (27) : ∆Pt = c0 + c1∆x1 + c2xt−1 + c3∆vt + c4vt−1 + et
is performed on the entire dataset (10 maturities each for all 3 futures contract types). This table presents the results
obtained for the Dec-2014 futures (TP14Z, NK14Z, and NO14Z) for illustration. The observations and characteristics
discussed are general and applicable to all other maturities. To better illustrate the difference in characteristics between
normal trading hours and after hours session, the regression is performed separately for T and T+1 settlements.
Panel A
TP NK NO
Settle C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
t-
st
at
is
ti
c
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
t-
sa
ti
st
ic
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
t-
st
at
is
ti
c
dx
T 1.2866 293.44 1.7513 176.09 1.3028 964.04
T+1 0.8484 108.30 1.0644 115.83 1.1849 723.05
x
T 0.0175 13.73 -0.0193 -9.94 0.0037 9.34
T+1 0.3479 54.65 -0.0026 -0.97 -0.0044 -9.77
dv
T 0.0078 41.17 0.0048 27.86 -0.0006 -36.70
T+1 0.0381 23.97 0.0125 32.87 -0.0007 -31.58
v
T 0.0158 65.78 0.0143 58.98 0.0025 92.01
T+1 0.0474 28.81 0.0274 54.76 0.0052 124.26
Intercept
T -0.0018 -2.50 0.0001 0.04 -0.0002 -0.82
T+1 -0.0150 -4.23 0.0006 0.34 0.0000 0.02
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Table IV: Model comparison.
This table compares the regression results of the 3 structural models discussed in this paper:
Eq. (25) : ∆Pt = c˜0 + c˜1∆xt + e˜t
Eq. (26) : ∆Pt = c′0 + c′1∆xt + c′2xt−1 + e′t
Eq. (27) : ∆Pt = c0 + c1∆x1 + c2xt−1 + c3∆vt + c4vt−1 + et
The comparison is performed across the entire dataset (10 maturities across 3 contract types). For discussion, the regres-
sion results for the Dec-2014 futures (TP14Z, NK14Z, and NO14Z) are presented, though the observed characteristics
are general and applicable to all futures investigated. In addition to the regression results, adjusted R2, Akaike Inform-
ation Criterion (AIC), and the relative joint price impact (RJPI) measure are also provided.
R2adj AIC (×106) RJPI Intercept dx x dv v
TP
14
Z Eq (27) 0.4093 2.6275 0.0212 -0.0036 1.1481 0.1012 0.0100 0.0163
Eq (26) 0.4041 2.6345 0.0377 -0.0040 1.1986 0.1738 - -
Eq (25) 0.3949 2.6469 - -0.0002 1.1118 - - -
N
K
14
Z Eq (27) 0.3762 2.8212 0.0419 -0.0001 1.3891 -0.0011 0.0076 0.0175
Eq (26) 0.3662 2.8332 0.0112 -0.0002 1.4418 0.1133 - -
Eq (25) 0.3636 2.8363 - 0.0002 1.3851 - - -
N
O
14
Z Eq (27) 0.7056 9.7619 0.0369 -0.0002 1.2379 0.0023 -0.0006 0.0034
Eq (26) 0.6978 9.8792 0.0040 -0.0002 1.2381 0.0435 - -
Eq (25) 0.6969 9.8915 - 0.0000 1.2163 - - -
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Table V: Relative joint price impact measure.
This table compares the relative joint price impact (RJPI) (i.e. the relative coefficient of partial determination), defined
as JPI/R2all, where JPI is the coefficient of partial determination and R
2
all is the coefficient of determination of the larger
model. The RJPI are compared across hourly buckets to provide intraday breakdown of the additional explanatory
power of volume information. Results presented in this table are based on analysis performed on aggregated hourly
data across all 10 maturities of each contract. In addition to the incremental explanatory power from Eq. (25) to Eq. (26)
(dx → dx, x) and from Eq. (25) to Eq. (27) (dx → dx, x, dv, v), the trade and volume tally for each hour is also tabulated.
TP NK NO
Hour dx
→
dx
,x
dx
→
dx
,x
,d
v,
v
Tr
ad
es
(×
10
6 )
Vo
lu
m
e
(×
10
6 )
dx
→
dx
,x
dx
→
dx
,x
,d
v,
v
Tr
ad
es
(×
10
6 )
Vo
lu
m
e
(×
10
6 )
dx
→
dx
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dx
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dx
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Tr
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es
(×
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Vo
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e
(×
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T
9 1.28 5.93 1.19 6.23 0.36 2.23 0.87 7.03 0.19 1.57 4.79 57.35
10 1.36 6.24 0.78 3.70 0.41 2.62 0.57 4.33 0.18 1.89 3.30 39.62
11 1.72 4.63 0.36 1.77 0.48 3.03 0.32 2.34 0.17 2.13 1.99 22.03
12 1.99 6.72 0.63 3.11 0.50 2.87 0.46 3.52 0.20 1.76 2.81 32.61
13 1.28 5.93 0.73 3.49 0.48 2.68 0.51 3.87 0.20 1.71 2.84 34.53
14 0.62 3.12 1.06 6.08 0.38 2.15 0.64 5.32 0.19 1.49 3.35 42.92
15 0.63 1.51 0.30 2.55 0.26 1.60 0.18 1.99 0.24 1.77 0.65 9.65
T+
1
16 10.68 14.55 0.10 0.42 0.72 4.10 0.15 1.14 0.21 2.33 1.00 10.26
17 14.26 17.62 0.14 0.49 0.83 4.30 0.26 1.76 0.23 2.94 1.59 18.21
18 14.48 17.64 0.10 0.36 1.00 4.63 0.19 1.18 0.25 3.27 1.23 13.18
19 17.62 20.52 0.07 0.25 0.95 5.30 0.15 0.86 0.21 3.36 1.04 10.40
20 18.95 21.01 0.06 0.18 1.16 4.99 0.13 0.70 0.24 3.51 0.98 9.14
21 19.67 21.41 0.08 0.22 1.32 4.74 0.19 0.93 0.26 2.50 1.34 11.82
22 20.30 22.73 0.11 0.31 1.44 5.27 0.29 1.36 0.29 2.30 2.02 17.70
23 16.07 18.01 0.07 0.22 1.54 5.95 0.35 1.62 0.32 2.59 2.32 21.64
24 26.82 29.66 0.03 0.09 2.06 6.76 0.25 1.17 0.37 3.01 1.62 15.96
1+1d 26.69 29.35 0.02 0.04 2.90 8.63 0.15 0.70 0.47 3.58 0.94 9.38
2+1d 20.47 23.01 0.01 0.03 2.70 7.59 0.11 0.50 0.59 3.32 0.61 5.84
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Figure 1: Regression results by hourly buckets for all three futures contract types.
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Figure 2: Relative Joint Price Impact (RJPI) by hourly buckets for all three futures contract types over the entire
sample period.
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Figure 3:
3(a) Daily regression results of TOPIX futures performed across 10 maturities for all three models.
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3(b) Daily regression results of Nikkei 225 futures performed across 10 maturities for all three models.
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3(c) Daily regression results of Nikkei mini 225 futures performed across 10 maturities for all three models.
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Figure 4:
4(a) Joint Price Impact measures computed daily across 10 maturities for TOPIX futures, highlighting the incremental
contribution from volume information (dv and v).
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4(b) Joint Price Impact measures computed daily across 10 maturities for Nikkei 225 futures, highlighting the incre-
mental contribution from volume information (dv and v).
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4(c) Joint Price Impact measures computed daily across 10 maturities for Nikkei mini 225 futures, highlighting the
incremental contribution from volume information (dv and v).
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